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UNITED STATES v. CORP: WHERE TO DRAW THE
INTERSTATE LINE ON CONGRESS' COMMERCE CLAUSE
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INTRASTATE POSSESSION OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
I. INTRODUCTION
Some crimes kill the spirit, while letting the body live.
Maybe that's why they seem the most vicious. Child por-
nography is that kind of crime, an assault on the soul as
much as the flesh. Many of the victims live in darkness
before finding the light again. Some never do.1
Traditionally, child molesters, pedophiles and child
pornographers had to cruise the streets and visit parks or play-
grounds where children play in order to locate a victim and satisfy
their urges.2 Some child exploiters are highly esteemed members
of the community in positions that provide easy access to children.
3
Regardless of how they find their victims, child exploiters have com-
municated with one another through secret underground clubs
1. It's Not So New; The new child pornography, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZE'Ir, Jan. 16,
2001, at B4 [hereinafter It's Not So New] (stating that stepdaughter in psychiatric
hospital and stepfather in jail, after stepfather raped her and took photos of her);
see also Frontline, Innocence Lost the Plea, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/shows/innocence (last visitedJan. 4, 2002) (providing summary of how seven
defendants, who ran Little Rascals Day Care in Edenton, N.C., ruined lives of
twenty-nine children and were charged with 429 counts of heinous sexual abuse).
2. See Mark Gado, Pedophiles and Child Molesters: The Slaughter of Innocence, at
http://crimelibrary.com/serial/pedophiles/4.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002)
(stating that child exploiter could not hang around school property or child
"hang-out" without arising suspicion); see also Mehagen Doyle, Sixteenth Annual In-
ternational Law Symposium "Rights of Children in the New Millennium ": Bad Apples in
Cyberspace: The Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Children Over the Internet, 21 WHI-IER
L. REv. 119, 122 (1999) (describing stereotypical dirty old man in trench coat
hanging around playground).
3. See Doyle, supra note 2, at 122 (stating that U.S. Customs officials arrested
minister, church choir leader, pediatrician and former head of child abuse unit for
New Orleans Police Department, all on child pornography charges).
(181)
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and networks. 4 The advent of the Internet, however, has radically
changed these traditional networks. 5
The continual expansion of the Internet has revolutionized
communication and interpersonal relations throughout the world.6
This revolution in technology has also "turned out to be the great-
est single advancement in the history of pedophilia. '' 7 The Internet
provides child exploiters with unique opportunities.
Now, the child exploiter has something that before the In-
ternet Age he could only dream about - unlimited and unrestricted
access to vulnerable children and a limitless source of child pornog-
raphy.8 For example, chat rooms allow child exploiters to lure vul-
nerable children to meet them, talk with other child exploiters or
trade sexually explicit photographs of children.9 Other sites allow
users to download pictures or order child pornography merchan-
dise. 10 "At any given time, there are, on average, around one mil-
lion sexually explicit pictures of children on the Internet.""
In response, the federal and state governments developed leg-
islation that prohibited the production, sale and distribution of
4. See id. (stating that child exploitation "business transactions" were difficult
due to secretive nature and interested persons either belonged to child sex rings
or knew someone who did); see also Gado, supra note 2 (stating child exploiters
relied on newspaper ads, sex clubs and prison contacts to communicate).
5. See Doyle, supra note 2, at 125 (stating that anyone with computer, modem
and scanner can produce, access and distribute child pornography around world
via Internet).
6. See Terrence Berg, www.wildwest.gov: The Impact of the Internet on State Power
to Enforce the Law, 2000 BYU L. REv. 1305, 1305 (2000) (stating that all types of
data, communications, commerce, imagery, art, literature and science are instanta-
neously available to everyone).
7. Gado, supra note 2.
8. See It's Not So New, supra note 1 (commenting that e-pornography business
thriving and Internet removed all obstacles and borders for child pornography).
9. See US Spins Wider Web to Halt Child Porn On-line, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 5, 2000, at 3. U.S. Customs official logged onto Internet chat room and found
sixty to seventy men trading child pornography. See id.; see also Gado, supra note 2.
"The Seattle Times reported that by 1998, over 1,500 suspected pedophiles in
[thirty two] states have been identified through various chat rooms on America's
most popular [I]nternet service (October 26, 1999)." Id.
10. See David Harper, Ruling Said No Obstacle, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 6, 2000. Of-
ficials detected two computer disks containing fifty-seven child pornography
images. See id. "Common sense would tell you that what was on those disks came
from the Internet .... " Id. Separate defendant pled guilty for possessing four
computer disks containing downloaded images of child pornography from the In-
ternet. See id.; see also Gado, supra note 2 (stating searches for child pornography
in popular browsers quickly returned results to numerous disturbing websites).
11. Jennifer Stewart, If This Is The Global Community, We Must Be On The Bad
Side Of Town: International Policing Of Child Pornography On The Internet, 20 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 205, 217 (1997) (commenting that Internet allows for production, distri-
bution and access to child pornography with little or no overhead costs).
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child pornography.12 This Comment narrowly focuses on the im-
pact of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act
of 1977 ("CASE"), as amended.1 3 More specifically, this Comment
focuses on the judicial interpretation of section 2252(a) (4) (B),
which Congress added as part of the amendments contained in the
Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of
1990 ("CPRPE Act").14 This particular section of the CPRPE Act
allows the federal government to punish those in possession of
child pornography that crossed interstate borders.
Section II of this Comment provides the legislative history of
the CPRPE Act.15 Additionally, this section provides recent U.S. Su-
preme Court caselaw concerning the Commerce Clause. 16 Section
II also provides the various circuit court cases that interpret Con-
gress' authority to regulate possession of child pornography under
the Commerce Clause. 17 Section III considers the various courts'
holdings examining intrastate possession of child pornography.18
Section IV analyzes the courts' opinions in light of the Commerce
Clause precedent.19 Finally, Section V summarizes the varying
12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2001) (punishing anyone taking active role in
sexual exploitation of children); 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2001) (requiring producers of
pornography to adhere to strict record keeping requirements); COLO. REV. STAT.
18-6-403 (2000) (relating to sexual exploitation of children); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6312 (2001) (relating to sexual abuse of children).
13. For a discussion of CASE, see infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2001). The relevant portion of this child pornogra-
phy statute reads as follows:
knowingly possesses 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video
tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or
so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if-
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct.
§ 2252(a) (4) (B); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (2001). For purposes of § 2252, a
"minor" is "any person under the age of eighteen years." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
15. For a discussion of the legislative history, see infra notes 21-39 and accom-
panying text.
16. For a discussion of the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning the
commerce clause, see infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the cases concerning Congress' authority to regulate
child pornography under the CPRPE Act, see infra notes 58-101 and accompany-
ing text.
18. For a discussion of the different courts' holdings regarding Congress' au-
thority to regulate child pornography under the CPRPE Act, see infra notes 102-
161 and accompanying text.
19. For an evaluation of the different courts' holdings under the CPRPE Act,
see infra notes 162-186 and accompanying text.
3
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courts' decisions, their impact and concludes in favor of the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of the CPRPE Act.
20
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of 18 U.S.C. § 2252
Congress, in 1978, enacted section 2252 of CASE. 21 Congress
enacted this section after finding that child pornography repre-
sented "a large industry - representing millions of dollars in annual
revenue - that operates on a nationwide scale and relies heavily on
the use of the mails and other instrumentalities of other state and
foreign commerce."22 Congress enacted CASE to fill gaps in cur-
rent federal laws that protected the health and welfare of children
in the United States.23 At the time of its enactment, section 2252
only prohibited the sale, distribution or transportation of child por-
nography that moved in interstate or foreign commerce.2 4 Addi-
tionally, the original statute required that the child pornography be
20. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
21. See Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 7, 7 (1978). As originally enacted, § 2252(a)
provided:
Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or
mails, for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, any, obscene
visual or print medium, if -
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, or
knowingly sells or distributes for sale, any obscene visual or print me-
dium that has been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed, if -
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; shall be pun-
ished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
§ 2(a), 92 Stat. at 8 (1978). For purposes of § 2253, a "minor" was originally de-
fined as a person under the age of sixteen. See 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (1978).
22. S. REP. No. 95-438, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 44. Con-
gress found that child pornography operated nationwide from both major cities
and small towns across the United States. See id. at 42-48.
23. See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 40-
41. Presently, no federal statute prohibited the production of materials containing
children in sexually explicit conduct. See id. CASE would prohibit the transporta-
tion or mailing of this material in interstate commerce. See id. Additionally, CASE
would impose more severe penalties for the sale and distribution of obscene child
pornography. See id.
24. See § 2(a), 92 Stat. at 7; S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5.
[Vol. 9: p. 181
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obscene. 25 Congress also believed CASE would help eliminate the
close connection between child pornography and child
prostitution.26
The Child Protection Act of 1984 ("CPA") substantially
amended section 2252 to improve the federal government's ability
to investigate and prosecute violations. 27 The 1984 amendments
eliminated the "for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale," "pe-
cuniary profit" and "obscene" requirements. 28 Furthermore, the
CPA amendments added a prohibition on the reproduction of
child pornography for distribution and raised the age of majority to
eighteen.29 Finally, the CPA amendments substantially increased
the monetary fines imposed for child pornography possession
violations.30
Later, the Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986 ("CAVRA")
strengthened the overall law and directly amended section 2252 (b)
by increasing the minimum sentence for repeat offenders from two
to five years.31 The CAVARA included legislative findings that
stated: "[c]hild exploitation has become a multi-million dollar in-
dustry, infiltrated and operated by elements of organized crime,
and by a nationwide network of individuals openly advertising their
desire to exploit children. '3 2 Furthermore, the Child Protection
and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 amended section
25. See § 2(a), 92 Stat. at 7-8; see also Bradley Scott Shannon, The Jurisdictional
Limits of Federal Criminal Child Pornography Law, 21 U. HAw. L. REv. 73, 79 (1999)
(discussing historical development of federal child pornography law).
26. See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5-11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40,
42-8 (detailing extent and effects of sexual exploitation of children).
27. See Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 4, 98 Stat. 204, 204
(1984); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 1 (1983) (stating that "developing constitu-
tional case law and prosecutional experience provide an assessment of the Act and
how its effectiveness can be improved").
28. See § 4, 98 Stat. at 204-05; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 1-2 (noting
recent U.S. Supreme Court case eliminated First Amendment requirement of
showing obscenity as condition precedent in government's interest in protecting
children).
29. See § 4, 98 Stat. at 204-05; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 5 (1983). A
reproduction amendment ensured that a producer of child pornography who did
not have a direct role in inducing a child's participation could not escape liability.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 5.
30. See § 4, 98 Stat. at 204-05 (raising maximum fine for first offense from
$10,000 to $100,000 and subsequent offense from $15,000 to $200,000).
31. See Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 702, 100
Stat. 3341, 3341-74 to 3341-75 (1986).
32. § 702, 100 Stat. at 3341-74 (including legislative findings of "physiological,
psychological, and emotional harm caused by the production, distribution, and
display of child pornography. .. ").
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2252(a) (1) to expressly prohibit the movement of child pornogra-
phy "by any means including by computer. '33
The statute, however, failed to address local possession, until
the Messes Commission extensively investigated the national com-
mercial nature of child pornography.3 4 The CPRPE Act added the
presently challenged section 2252 (a) (4) (B).35 The new paragraphs
(a) (3) and (a) (4) now contain a broadened jurisdictional element
that includes child pornography "produced using materials" that
moved in interstate or foreign commerce, and an alternative juris-
dictional element that is based on the location of the sale or posses-
sion of the child pornography.3 6
The Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998
added the latest amendment to section 2252 by increasing the pen-
alties for child pornography offenses.37 The amendment reduced,
from three or more to one or more, the required number of child
pornography materials required for a conviction.3 8 Additionally,
the amendment created an affirmative defense for defendants pos-
sessing less than three such materials whom "promptly and in good
faith . . .took reasonable steps to destroy each such visual depic-
tion; ... or reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and
afforded that agency access to each such visual depiction. 39
B. Recent Developments in Commerce Clause Litigation
Notwithstanding previous Commerce Clause precedent, United
States v. Lopez4° is a starting point for determining whether a partic-
ular statute is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce
33. Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 7511(b), 102 Stat. 4485, 4485 (1998).
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE Attorney General's Commission on Pornogra-
phy: Final Report 406, 475 (1986) (stating that child pornography "involves photo-
graphs taken by child abusers themselves, and then either kept or informally
distributed to other child abusers").
35. See Child Pornography Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323(a),
(b), 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (1990); Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1, 104 Stat. 4789, 4789
(1990). The CPRPE Act was enacted as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990. See
§ 1, 104 Stat. at 4789; see also United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 481 (3d Cir.
1999) (finding that before 1990 Amendment "it was costly for pornographers to
traffic in pornography across state lines, though it was costless (at least under fed-
eral law) to manufacture and use pornography intrastate").
36. See § 323(a), 104 Stat. at 4818.
37. See Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-314, §§ 202-03, 112 Stat. 2974, 2978 (1999).
38. See § 203(a) (1), 112 Stat. at 29 7 7-78 ; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-557, (1998)
(stating amendments target offenders who stalk children on Internet).
39. § 203, 112 Stat. at 2978; 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (2001).
40. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Clause authority.41 In Lopez, the Supreme Court determined that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA"), which punished those
who knowingly possessed a firearm within a designated school zone,
was an unconstitutional regulation. 42 The Court held that "[t]he
Act neither regulate [d] a commercial activity nor containe [d] a re-
quirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce."43 In reaching its decision, the Court was concerned
with granting Congress excessive power that would allow them to
regulate any type of activity remotely associated with economic pro-
ductivity. 44 The Lopez Court held that the Commerce Clause per-
mitted Congress to regulate: (1) the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 45
The Court evaluated the GFSZA under the third prong.46 The
majority of the Court held that "[t] he possession of a gun in a local
school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might... sub-
stantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. '47 Additionally,
the Court noted that the GFSZA contained "no jurisdictional ele-
ment which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce."48
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
42. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (2000). "[F]or
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise
affects interstate commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone" is a federal offense. § 922(q) (2) (A).
43. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
44. See id. at 564. If the Government's viewpoint was accepted, "Congress
could regulate any activity... related to economic productivity of individual citi-
zens" and that "it [would be] difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power."
Id.
45. See id. at 558-59.
46. See id. at 560 ("Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."); see also id. at 559
(finding that GFSZA did not regulate use of channels of interstate commerce nor
protect instrumentality of interstate commerce).
47. Id. at 567. The Court rejected the government's argument that violent
crimes affected the national economy through the cost of insurance that ultimately
spreads to everyone, and that violent crimes deterred people from traveling to
areas they believed were unsafe. See id. at 563-64. But see Glen H. Reynolds &
Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held
a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 369, 374 (2000) (not-
ing that four dissenters in Lopez accepted government's "national productivity"
argument).
48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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The Supreme Court further articulated the proper Commerce
Clause review by applying the Lopez factors in United States v. Morri-
son.4 9 The Court, in Morrison, struck down 42 U.S.C. § 13981 as un-
constitutional. 50 This statute, also known as the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA"), provided a federal civil remedy for the vic-
tims of gender-motivated crimes.51 In Morrison, Christy Brzonkala
alleged that two members of the varsity football team assaulted and
repeatedly raped her when all three were students at Virginia
Tech.52  After school administrative remedies proved futile,
Brzonkala brought suit in federal court under VAWA, inter alia,
against her assailants and the university. 53 In determining the Com-
merce Clause controversy, the Court posed four questions in addi-
tion to the Lopez factors:
(1) Is the prohibited activity commercial or economic in
nature?;
(2) Is there an express jurisdictional element involving in-
terstate activity which might limit the statute's reach?;
(3) Did Congress make findings about the effects of the
prohibited conduct on interstate commerce?; and
(4) Is the link between the prohibited activity and the ef-
fect on interstate commerce attenuated?54
First, the court noted that the conduct being controlled by sec-
tion 13981 [gender-motivated violence] was "not, in any sense of
the phrase, economic activity."55 Second, the Court found that, like
the GFSZA, the statue contained no explicit jurisdictional ele-
49. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
50. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617, 627 (rejecting government's argument that
Congress authorized to regulate noneconomic, violent conduct based on aggre-
gate effect on interstate commerce).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2001). "A person ... who commits a crime of
violence motivated by gender.., shall be liable to the party injured." § 13891 (c).
Congress limited § 13891 by stating "nothing in this section entitles a person to a
cause of action... for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that
can not be demonstrated . . . to be motivated by gender." Id. at § 13891(e) (1).
Furthermore, the statute did not cover state-law claims "seeking the establishment
of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
decree." Id. at § 13891(e) (4).
52. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602-03 (stating that attack caused Brzonkala to
become severally depressed and ultimately withdraw from university).
53. See id. at 604 (stating that previous school-conducted hearing that found
Morrison guilty of sexual assault and sentenced him to two semester suspension
was subsequently reduced to "using abusive language" and school repealed his
sentence).
54. Id. at 610-11.
55. Id. at 613 (stating that cases upholding Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity have been "only where the activity is economic in nature").
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ment.56 Third, in contrast to Lopez, the Court acknowledged that
numerous congressional findings showed that gender-motivated vi-
olence had serious impacts on the victims and their families; how-
ever, the congressional findings alone were insufficient to sustain
the constitutionality of the legislation under the Commerce
Clause.5
7
C. Circuit Courts' Decisions Regarding Section 2252(a) (4) (B)
In recent years, numerous federal appellate courts have up-
held Congress' Commerce Clause authority to regulate the posses-
sion of child pornography under the CPRPE Act. The circuit courts
have developed two distinct methods of judicial interpretation: 1)
objective and narrow and 2) subjective and broad. For instance,
the First and Eighth Circuits, in United States v. Robinson58 and
United States v. Bausch,59 respectively, have held that the presence of
a jurisdictional element, or "hook," is alone sufficient to constitu-
tionally allow Congress to regulate, through interstate commerce,
the purely intrastate possession of child pornography. 60 Con-
versely, the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits in United States v.
Rodia,6 1 United States v. Kallestad6 2 and United States v. Angle,63 re-
spectively, used a different theory to uphold Congress' Commerce
Clause authority. These courts determined that Congress could ra-
tionally conclude that possession of child pornography "substan-
tially affected" interstate commerce and the means were rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. The courts evaluated
the specific facts of each defendant's possession and source of ille-
56. See id. at 611-12.
57. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("Simply because Congress may conclude that
a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so.") (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)).
58. 137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998).
59. 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998).
60. See United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1465 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
A jurisdictional element or "hook" refers to a provision in a federal statute that
requires the government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal
jurisdiction in connection with any individual application of the statute. See id.; see
also United States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 1998). Ajurisdictional ele-
ment expressly requires a nexus between the activity regulated and interstate com-
merce, thus ensuring Congress exercised its Commerce Clause authority to reach a
discrete set of criminal acts that have an explicit connection with or effect on inter-
state commerce. See Pierson, 139 F.3d at 553.
61. 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999).
62. 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).
63. 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000).
189
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gal child pornography to determine if the materials, in any way,
affected interstate commerce. 64
1. Narrow, Strict Holdings
In Bausch, the defendantJames Donald Bausch took pictures of
two girls, aged fifteen and sixteen with a camera made in Japan.65
The girls posed nude and in sexually suggestive scenes.66 The dis-
trict court convicted Bausch for possessing photographs of the mi-
nor girls engaged in sexually explicit conduct.67
Bausch appealed the district court's sentence on grounds that
Congress exceeded its authority to regulate commerce by making
intrastate possession of child pornography a federal crime.68 The
Eighth Circuit held that section 2252 (a) (4) (B) was a proper exer-
cise of Congress' commerce power and therefore, was not facially
unconstitutional. 69 Because the defendant took the photos, with a
camera made in Japan and shipped to the United States, he directly
affected interstate commerce.7 0
In Robinson, the district court convicted defendant Gilbert A.
Robinson for possessing fifty photographs depicting boys in their
mid to late teens in nude poses. 71 The court convicted Robinson
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) and sentenced him to eigh-
teen months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
64. For an explanation of the facts of these cases and the courts' holdings, see
infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
65. See United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating
that use of camera made in foreign country satisfies Commerce Clause).
66. See id. at 740. Bausch was convicted of possessing three or more photo-
graphs of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct under § 2256(2) (A), and
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" under § 2256(2) (E). See id.; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B)(1994).
67. See Bausch, 140 F.3d at 740 (stating that district court sentenced defendant
to probation).
68. See id. at 740-41 (arguing that Congress lacks power to regulate possession
when photographs have not traveled in interstate commerce and were never in-
tended to be placed in commerce).
69. See id. at 741 (holding Congress properly exercised commerce clause
power by regulating activities that substantially affected interstate commerce).
70. See id. at 741. The statute contained an express jurisdictional element that
required interstate travel of either the photographs or material used to produce
the photographs. See id. Therefore, if the jurisdictional "hook" was triggered, the
defendant had directly affected interstate commerce. See id.
71. See United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 653 (1st Cir. 1998) (describ-
ing that search of defendant's house revealed photos containing handwritten de-
scriptive information regarding boys' names, ages and date photos were taken).
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release. 72 He appealed claiming that section 2252(a) (4) (B) ex-
ceeded Congress' commerce regulating authority. 73
The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the application of
the jurisdictional "hook" in section 2252(a) (4) (B) because the de-
fendant used a Kodak instant camera and Kodak instant film to take
the photographs.74 Therefore, Robinson directly affected interstate
commerce, even though the possession of the pictures was purely
intrastate. 75
2. Broad, Discretionary Holding
The Third Circuit, in Rodia, held that a jurisdictional element
alone could not render a statute per se constitutional. 76 Rodia pled
guilty to intrastate possession of child pornography. 77 The defen-
dant triggered the jurisdictional hook by taking the photographs
with Polaroid film manufactured outside of New Jersey.78 Rodia ap-
pealed the district court's sentence of a twenty-one month prison
term, followed by three years of parole with special conditions. 79
The Third Circuit stated that in completing the proper review
they must first "ascertain whether Congress 'could rationally con-
clude that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce.' ,s If the facts affirmatively supported this conclusion, then
they "must consider whether 'the means chosen by Congress [were]
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' 81
72. See id.
73. See id. at 653, 655-56 (arguing that intrastate photo possession did not fall
within Lopez factors and therefore did not trigger Commerce Clause).
74. See id. at 653 (stating Eastman Kodak Company manufactured both cam-
era and film outside of Massachusetts).
75. See id. at 656. "By outlawing the purely intrastate possession of child por-
nography... Congress can curb the nationwide demand for these materials." Id.
76. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471-73 (3d Cir. 1999).
A hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element auto-
matically ensures the constitutionality of a statute ignores the fact that the
connection between the activity regulated and the jurisdiction hook may
be so attenuated as to fail to guarantee that the activity regulated has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 472.
77. See id. at 469 (stating that defendant knowingly possessed numerous child
pornography photographs).
78. See id. (stating that district court denied Rodia's motion in limine that Con-
gress had exceeded its power under Commerce Clause because § 2252 (a) (4) (B)
regulated purely intrastate possession).
79. See id. (noting that by entering guilty plea, defendant did not preserve
right to appeal and appellate court had jurisdiction).
80. Id. (quoting United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 1996)).
81. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 49. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
11
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During the first inquiry, the Third Circuit considered the exis-
tence of significant congressional findings and legislative history
prompting the enactment of CASE, and concluded that intrastate
possession of child pornography substantially impacted interstate
commerce.8 2 Furthermore, the court held section 2252(a) (4) (B)
was a reasonable regulatory exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause power that rationally related to the reduction of the overall
national child pornography market.8 3
The Seventh Circuit used similar judicial review in Angle.84
The court convicted the defendant, inter alia, for possession of child
pornography in violation of section 2252(a) (4) (B). 8 5 After a pe-
riod of surveillance, the FBI confiscated a videotape cassette, com-
puter diskettes and zip disks containing child pornography from
Angle's residence. 86 The jurisdictional hook applied to Angle be-
cause the videotape cassette and computer diskettes were not man-
ufactured in the State of Indiana, and the zip disks were assembled
in Taiwan.8 7 The district court sentenced the defendant to 325
months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised
release.88
Angle appealed arguing, inter alia, that Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause authority and the government failed to satisfy
the jurisdictional element.89 The Seventh Circuit rejected the strict
reasoning adopted in Bausch and Robinson and agreed with Rodia by
determining that section 2252(a) (4) (B) regulated an activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce. 90
Two recent circuit court cases concerning intrastate possession
of child pornography highlighted the subjective and inconsistent
problems that may arise when applying the Commerce Clause pre-
82. See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479.
83. See id. at 478 (stating that means were "punishing the intrastate possession
of child pornography" and ends were "prohibiting interstate commerce in child
pornography and reducing the inevitable harm to children that stems from their
involvement in child pornography").
84. See United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000).
85. See id. at 341 (noting that court also charged Angle with attempted receipt
of child pornography and attempted solicitation of minor, via Internet and tele-
phone, to engage in sexually prohibited activities).
86. See id. at 331.
87. See id. at 332.
88. See id. at 333.
89. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 333 (arguing that jurisdictional element cannot au-
tomatically ensure constitutionality of statute because of failure to limit intrastate
application).
90. See id. at 341 (declining to uphold statute on grounds that it contained
jurisdictional hook and instead upholding under third Lopez factor).
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cedent. While both cases upheld the constitutionality of the
CPRPE Act, the courts disagreed regarding what exactly affects in-
terstate commerce.
First, in Kallestad, the district court convicted the defendant for
possessing numerous photographs and films of nude minor wo-
men.91 The defendant photographed girls who responded to his
add in a local newspaper for "slender female nude models."92 The
film used to produce the photos was manufactured outside of
Texas. 93 The court held the jurisdictional element alone was not
sufficient to uphold the CPRPE Act as constitutional. 94 The court
then applied the Lopez and Morrison factors to determine whether
Congress could rationally regulate local possession in order to curb
interstate possession of child pornography.95 Although the defen-
dant never intended to sell the pictures, the self-generated pornog-
raphy was sufficiently linked to the national market that Congress
was attempting to eliminate. 96
Finally, in United States v. Corp, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
defendant's conviction and sentence under section 2252(a) (4) (B)
by holding there was an insufficient nexus with interstate com-
merce. 97 The police recovered, from Corp's house, photographs
depicting pornographic shots of young females and women en-
gaged in sexual acts. 98 Ultimately, the photos depicted only one
seventeen-year-old minor, Sandra Sauntman, nude and/or engaged
91. See United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 226 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating
that nude photos found in Austin, Texas home contained notes regarding wo-
men's names, addresses and phone numbers).
92. Id. (stating that several girls responding to defendant's "model" ad were
sixteen to seventeen-year-old high school students).
93. See id. at 226. No evidence, however, was introduced proving any of the
pictures traveled through interstate commerce. See id. at 229.
94. See id. at 229 (rejecting government's arguments and holding that when
relationship between interstate activity and local activity is too attenuated, jurisdic-
tional hook will be insufficient to justify aggregating effects upon interstate
commerce).
95. See id. at 229-30 (focusing inquiry on whether local child pornography
market was interdependent and interacted with national market).
96. See Kallestad, 263 F.3d at 230-31 (noting that local possession must be elim-
inated due to impossibility of determining where child pornography originated).
97. See 236 F.3d 325, 326 (6th Cir. 2001).
98. See id. at 326 (stating one of females was Corp's twenty-six-year-old wife,
Heather).
13
Seman: United States v. Corp: Where to Draw the Interstate Line on Congr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
194 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
in sexual activity.99 Additionally, the film Corp used was manufac-
tured in Germany. l0 0
The Sixth Circuit applied the Lopez framework in conjunction
with the Morrison analysis to the facts in this case and determined
that Corp was not a "typical offender," and that the government
failed to prove his activity substantially affected interstate
commerce.101
III. ANALYsis
The impetus of CASE, as amended, is to punish pedophiles
and reduce the resulting harm to children.10 2 The goal of the
CPRPE Act section 2252 (a) (4) (B) was to allow Congress to regu-
late the purely intrastate possession of child pornography. 10 3 The
U.S. Constitution, however, grants the federal government limited
and enumerated powers.' 0 4 To act in accordance with the Constitu-
tion, Congress' authority cannot exceed these limitations. 0 5
In the context of the CPRPE Act, the courts applied the Lopez
and Morrison framework to determine if Congress enacted a consti-
tutional regulation. This section explains the rationale the courts
used in upholding the constitutionality of section 2252(a) (4) (B).
99. See id. at 326-27. Corp began dating Sauntman when she was seventeen,
and Sauntman voluntarily posed for the pictures and engaged in sexual acts with
Corp's wife. See id. at 326. Sauntman believed she had been "showcased as a victim
by the FBI, but not treated like a victim . . . she denie[d] she ha[d] suffered any
psychological harm as a result of the offense" and this incident "was strictly some-
thing personal." Id. at 326 n.5 (citations omitted in original).
100. See id. at 336-37 (discussing that despite no allegation that defendant dis-
tributed, gave copies or invited others to view photographs, origin of film had
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce).
101. See id. at 333.
102. For a discussion detailing the legislative findings regarding child pornog-
raphy and the effects of sexual exploitation of children, see supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of the CPRPE Act's purpose, see supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
104. SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). "The powers of the legis-
lature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or for-
gotten, the constitution is written." Id.
105. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974). "In the perform-
ance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must ini-
tially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch
is due great respect by the others." Id.; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 607 (2000). "Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Govern-
ment demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." Morrison, 539 U.S.
at 607.
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A. Narrow, Strict Holdings
The courts' analyses in Robinson and Bausch were straightfor-
ward and simple. Both courts compared the present facts of their
case against the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez.106 The courts
acknowledged that Congress could regulate three types of activi-
ties. 10 7 These courts determined that section 2252(a) (4) (B) al-
lowed Congress to properly exercise their commerce power under
the third category, i.e., activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 10s
The courts acknowledged that CPRPE Act contained an ex-
plicit jurisdictional element, something that the statute at issue in
Lopez did not.109 Therefore, the courts reasoned that each defen-
dant's pornography possession affected interstate commerce due to
the fact that they used materials that crossed state boundaries to
produce the photographs.1l ° The jurisdictional element allowed
the courts to avoid any in-depth economic investigation and over-
look the severity of the defendant's conduct.111 For instance, in
Robinson, the defendant used a Kodak instant camera and Kodak
instant film, both manufactured out-of-state, to produce all the pho-
tographs.1 1 2 Additionally, in Bausch, the defendant used a camera
made in Japan to take the photographs of nude minor girls. 1 3
106. For a discussion on Lopez, see supra notes 40-48.
107. To determine the scope of these activities, see supra notes 44-45 and ac-
companying text.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998)
(noting such possession perpetuated national market for sexually explicit materials
depicting minors).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2001) (requiring that visual depictions,
or material used to create depictions, be "mailed, . . .shipped, or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce").
110. See Robinson, 137 F.3d at 656. "The jurisdictional element in § 2252
(a) (4) (B) requires an answer on a case-by-case basis to the question whether the
particular possession of child pornography affected interstate commerce." Id.;
United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998). "The statute contains
an express jurisdictional element requiring the transport in interstate or foreign
commerce of the visual depictions or the materials used to produce them."
Bausch, 140 F.3d at 741.
111. See Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the
jurisdictional element ensured, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the defen-
dant's conduct affected interstate commerce. See id. However, the focus was on
the items used to produce the materials, rather than determining whether the
product traveled over interstate borders or was used in an economic manner. See
id.
112. See Robinson, 137 F.3d at 653 (noting that Eastman Kodak Company pro-
duced both items outside of Massachusetts).
113. See Bausch, 140 F.3d at 741 (noting that use of camera and film manufac-
tured in other state satisfies Commerce Clause) (citing Robinson, 137 F.3d 652,
653).
15
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The courts looked no further than the jurisdictional element
to uphold the regulation. First, the courts acknowledged the eco-
nomic nature of child pornography, thus allowing possession to fall
under the third Lopez prong. 114 Then, the court applied the juris-
dictional hook in a strict liability manner.' 15 In both instances, the
defendants used materials that traveled across state lines and there-
fore, their actions triggered the jurisdictional hook. 16 The courts
held that the Commerce Clause applied and the statute was a
proper regulation over intrastate activity.1 17
The only significant difference between the two earlier cases,
applying the jurisdictional hook, and the later cases, inquiring
whether the defendants' local possession influenced the national
market, is that the earlier two were decided prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison.118 This difference may explain the
courts shift from holding defendants criminally liable based merely
on the presence of a jurisdictional element and their shift towards
an economic analysis of the defendant's conduct.
Broad, Discretionary Holdings
The courts' logic in the cases decided after Morrison involved a
more thorough analysis of the facts and all held that the presence
of a jurisdictional hook alone was insufficient to uphold the consti-
tutionality of the statute. 119 This more thorough examination
114. See Robinson, 137 F.3d at 656 (distinguishing between uneconomic na-
ture of gun possession in Lopez and nationwide multi-million dollar child pornog-
raphy industry).
115. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S LEGAL DICTIONARY 154 (2d ed. 1996). Defin-
ing strict liability as "civil or criminal liability imposed upon a person without re-
gard to whether the person intentionally or knowingly did anything wrong or was
in any way reckless or negligent." Id.
116. To determine the defendant's action in each case, see supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text.
117. See Bausch, 140 F.3d at 741 (holding that interstate or foreign transporta-
tion of camera triggered express jurisdictional element of § 2252, therefore defen-
dant's conviction affirmed); Robinson, 137 F.3d at 656 (holding that when express
jurisdictional element triggered, Congress can regulate purely intrastate possession
of child pornography, therefore defendant's conviction affirmed).
118. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600-04 (2000). The Court
acknowledged, like Lopez, the present statute contained no jurisdictional hook. See
id. Unlike Lopez, legislative history contained congressional findings that violence
against women affected interstate commerce. See id. at 601. However, "[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activ-
ity." Id. at 601. To prevent Congress from obliterating the constitutional limita-
tions and shifting the proper state and federal power balance, the regulated
activity must be economic in nature and truly affect interstate commerce. See id. at
602-04.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 1999) (dis-
missing hard and fast application of jurisdictional element).
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opened the door to ambiguity. The courts all mentioned the exten-
sive documentation concerning the commercial nature of child
pornography and how intrastate possession contributed to the over-
all evil. 120 The following text emphasizes how a particular case can
present the courts with a varying degree of complexity when trying
to ascertain whether a defendant's activity substantially affected in-
terstate commerce. Some cases clearly illustrate that the CPRPE
Act directly applies to a defendant's conduct and goes to the heart
of the statute by punishing pedophiles, while other cases are less
certain.121
Angle is a paradigm case illustrating the CPRPE Act's effective-
ness for punishing pedophiles that directly contribute to and per-
petuate the national child pornography market. The defendant,
Ralph Angle, was convicted of several crimes relating to his interest
in child pornography and his pursuit of a minor for sexual gratifica-
tion.1 22 For instance, Angle, who lived in Indiana, used the In-
ternet to engage in sexually explicit conversations with minors and
attempted to meet with the children he contacted. 123 The FBI
traced the computer screen name, "Butch 8003," to Angle.1 24 An-
gle continued to converse with the FBI, who was disguised as "Jeff/
Wolf One."' 25 Angle offered money and gifts in exchange for per-
sonal information regarding 'Jeff/Wolf One."' 26 During a tele-
phone conversation, Angle told 'Jeff/Wolf One" that he wanted to
120. For a detailed discussion of the legislative findings, see supra notes 22-39
and accompanying text.
121. Compare United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 329-30 (7th Cir. 2000)
(prosecuting pedophile that attempted to use Internet to lure young boys to meet
with him), with United State v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 326 (6th Cir. 2001) (prosecut-
ing an adult who took pictures of his girlfriend that was three to five months short
of majority age of eighteen).
122. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 329, 345-47 (stating that Seventh Circuit vacated
and remanded district court's sentence of approximately twenty-seven years impris-
onment due to failure to explain sentencing enhancements and upward departure
from applicable guidelines).
123. See id. at 326-27, 330 n.1. After investigating his children's use of the
computer, the father reported to the FBI several computer screen names of indi-
viduals contacting his children. See id. at 329. The father logged on to the com-
puter using children's screen name, "Wolf One 676," and created an electronic
profile of a thirteen year-old boy named Jeff. See id. at 330 n.1.
124. See id. at 329-30 (stating that FBI conducted nationwide investigation
against individuals that used Internet to lure children into sexual relationships).
125. See id. at 330 (stating that FBI undercover agent used "Jeff/Wolf One" to
converse with defendant and indicated he was from troubled home).
126. See id. Angle requested "Jeff/Wolf One's" telephone number and ad-
dress in Colorado and indicated that he wanted to visit him and take him shop-
ping. See id. Angle also told "Jeff/Wolf One" that he loved him. See id.
17
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purchase a camera so that 'Jeff/Wolf One" could send pictures of
himself to Angle. 127
In addition to his interest in 'Jeff/Wolf One," Angle corre-
sponded via e-mail with a Colorado-based child pornography dis-
tributor attempting to purchase five videotapes of child
pornography. 128 Angle mailed a money order to the distributor
and several instructional e-mails regarding the tapes delivery. 129
Angle sent a final e-mail confirming the delivery date and reiterat-
ing his vacation plans to Mexico where he "[had] boys lined up ...
and waiting for [his] arrival."130
The United States Customs Service stopped Angle as he at-
tempted to re-enter the United States from Mexico and searched
his luggage.13' A few days later, federal and state law enforcement
officers executed a search warrant at Angle's residence seeking
child pornography in various forms.1 32
In upholding Angle's conviction under section 2252 (a) (4) (B),
the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the outcome reached solely by
use of the jurisdictional element in Robinson and Bausch.'3 3 Instead,
the court formatted the analysis as whether Congress could ration-
127. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 330.
128. See id. The FBI previously closed this distributor and began using it for
an undercover operation. See id. at 330 n.2. Angle's name appeared on the distrib-
utor's customer membership list. See id. at 330 n.3. The FBI targeted people that
previously purchased child pornographic material. See id. at 330 n.2.
129. See id. at 330-32. Angle mailed a money order payable to the distributor
for $161. See id. at 330. A subsequent e-mail confirmed that money was for tapes
depicting children under the age of seventeen engaged in graphic sexual activity.
See id. at 331. An additional e-mail delayed the delivery date because Angle
planned a vacation to Mexico to "play with the boys." See id. at 332.
130. Id. at 330; see also Doyle, supra note 2, at 125-26 (noting that child por-
nography is global problem including countries like England, Germany, Nether-
lands, Hungary, Czech Republic and others in Southeast Asia, with United States as
largest consumer market).
131. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 331 (indicating that Customs agents found video
camcorder and at least one tape containing child pornography images).
132. See id. at 331-32. The officers found a videotape titled "Jap Boys/Mexi-
can Boys" depicting boys between the ages of ten and fifteen. See id. at 331. The
officers also found a large quantity of diskettes and zip disks containing child por-
nography. See id. at 331-32.
133. See id. at 336. The court, agreeing with the Third Circuit, reasoned that:
A jurisdictional element is only sufficient to ensure a statute's constitu-
tionality when the element either limits the regulation to interstate activ-
ity or ensures that the intrastate activity to be regulated falls within one of
the three categories of congressional power.
As a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless
here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on
film, cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce and will
therefore fall within the sweep of the statute.
Id. (citations omitted in original).
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ally believe that the intrastate possession of child pornography had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce; and further, that the
regulatory means chosen were reasonably adapted to the end.13 4
Therefore, the court upheld the statute as a category three regula-
tion by finding an economic nexus, via the market theory, between
interstate commerce and the intrastate possession of child pornog-
raphy. 135 The court reasoned that Congress needed to curb the
intrastate possession of child pornography in order to eliminate the
multimillion-dollar nationwide industry.
This case illustrated how "the sale and distribution of such por-
nographic materials are carried on to a substantial extent through
the mails and other instrumentalities of interstate and foreign com-
merce." 13 6 Angle also clearly fit the description of a pedophile by
preying on the vulnerable.13 7 The CPRPE Act, however, can also
punish defendants whose actions, while still unacceptable, are less
shocking and apprehensive than those of a pedophile. The follow-
ing two cases illustrate how the CPRPE Act can be overinclusive if
applied improperly.
134. See id. at 337. The court again agreed with the Third Circuit that Con-
gress could have rationally believed the following:
Some pornographers manufacture, possess, and use child pornography
exclusively within the boundaries of a state, and often only within the
boundaries of their own property. It is unrealistic to think that those
pornographers will be content with their own supply, hence they will
likely wish to explore new or additional pornographic photographs of
children. Many of these pornographers will look to the interstate market
as a source of new material, whether through mail order catalogs or
through the Internet. Therefore, the possession of "home grown" por-
nography may well stimulate a further interest in pornography that im-
mediately or eventually animates demand for interstate pornography. It
is also reasonable to believe the related proposition that discouraging the
intrastate possession of pornography will cause some of these child
pornographers to leave the realm of child pornography completely,
which in turn will reduce the interstate demand for pornography.
Id. at 337-38 (quoting United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 477 (3d Cir. 1999)).
135. See id. at 338. The court distinguished the gun control law at issue in
Lopez by finding that the regulation of child pornography was "an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity... that arises out of or [is] connected with
a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects inter-
state commerce." Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
The court also distinguished the CPRPE Act from Morrison by emphasizing that the
VAWA was directed only to noneconomic criminal activity. See id. at 338 n.13.
136. United States v. Winningham, 953 F. Supp. 1068, 1074 n.13 (D. Minn.
1996) (quoting S. REP. No. 95438, at 3-5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40,
42-43).
137. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 330-31 (noting defendant's use of Internet to lure
children, collection of child pornography videos, current attempts to purchase
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In Kallestad, the defendant, Charles Kallestad, advertised for
"slender female nude models" in Austin, Texas newspapers.
1 3 8
Government agents found a large number of nude photos and
films of women. 139 Several of the women responding to the adver-
tisements were sixteen to seventeen years old and were filmed or
photographed while engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
140
The Fifth Circuit upheld his conviction under the CPRPE Act
by finding that Congress could rationally believe that local posses-
sion of child pornography was necessary to regulate the national
market.' 4 1 Kallestad argued that the purely intrastate possession,
like the crime of possessing a gun near a school zone, is non-eco-
nomic in nature and does not substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 142 Under the first Morrison factor, the majority responded
by stating the conduct here, defined broadly, was commercial in
nature. 143 The court analogized Wickard v. Filburn to affirm that,
when a person produces a product for his own consumption that is
traded in an interstate market, his conduct becomes economic in
nature. 144 As for the second Morrison factor, the court acknowl-
138. See United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 226 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating
that some advertisements indicated that model age unimportant).
139. See id. (stating that film used to make photos and films manufactured
outside of Texas).
140. See id. (noting that several girls told defendant their age and that they
were high school students).
141. See id. at 226-28. The court applied the Lopez and Morrison framework to
uphold the constitutionality of the CPRPE Act.
142. See id. at 228. Judge Jolly, as indicated in his dissent, found merit in
Kallestad's assertion. See id. at 231-33 (Jolly, J., dissenting). "Kallestad's non-com-
mercial, local possession of child pornography, where no interstate transportation
or commercial transacting occurred, had at most an insubstantial affect on the
interstate market for child pornography." Id. at 233.
143. See Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 228. The court noted that most of the nation-
ally distributed child pornography is produced by child exploiters themselves. See
id. These materials are then distributed to others through the mails, computers or
submitted to commercial magazines. See id.
144. See id. at 228; see also Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). The act of pos-
sessing and consuming wheat directly affected the national market price of wheat,
and Congress was justified in regulating the private wheat consumption because:
It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and
market conditions. This may arise because being in marketable condi-
tion such wheat overhangs the market and, if induced by rising prices,
tends to flows into the market and check price increases . . . .Home-
grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128. But see Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 233 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
The dissent believed the application of Wickard was overextended because the local
possession of self-generated child pornography does not have a direct and substan-
tial effect on the national market. See id. The evidence showed that the defendant
did not, nor had any intention to purchase, trade, sell or barter the pornography.
See id.
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edged that section 2252(a) (4) (B) contained a jurisdictional
hook.145 The court held, however, that the jurisdictional hook
alone could not constitutionally validate section 2252(a) (4) (B). 146
In response to the third Morrison factor, the court determined that
ample congressional findings supported the proposition that local
possession impacted interstate commerce. 47 Finally, the court
found that Congress must regulate purely intrastate possession in
order to eradicate the national market. 148
A national market for child pornography exists, and the local
possession affects the supply and demand aspects of this market.
The court summarized by stating that Congress had no interest in
Wickard's wheat, but confiscated it in an effort to eliminate the po-
tential aggregate private supply.149 Similarly, Congress rationally
could confiscate self-generated pornography to diminish the supply
and hopefully eliminate the defendant's desires to supplement his
own collection through the national market.150 The dissent in Kal-
lestad, however, emphasized the non-economic nature of self-gener-
ated child pornography produced for private use.151
The Sixth Circuit, in Corp, used an analogous argument to re-
verse the lower court's conviction under the CPRPE Act.' 52 After
145. See Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 228 (noting that no evidence proved that Kalles-
tad's pictures moved through interstate commerce, but film did). For explanation
of jurisdictional hook, see supra note 60.
146. See Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 229. "Where the relationship between the inter-
state and local activity is attenuated, a jurisdictional hook alone cannot justify ag-
gregating effects upon interstate commerce to find Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause." Id.
147. See id. at 229. These findings indicate that child pornography is a grow-
ing, predatory business. See id. To examine the congressional findings, see supra
notes 22-39 and the accompanying text.
148. See Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 231. "[W]here the product is fungible, such
that it is difficult if not impossible to trace, Congress can prohibit local possession
in an effort to regulate product supply and demand and thereby halt interstate
trade." Id.
149. See id. (stating intention was regulation of national market).
150. See id. But see id. at 232 (jolly, J., dissenting) (stating that Constitution
requires distinction between what is truly national and truly local).
151. See id. at 232 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (stating that "thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation if intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature" and therefore, majority opinion
unconstitutionally applied § 2252(a) (4) to Kallestad's conduct).
152. See United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 2001). The district
court, citing Bausch and Robinson, convicted Corp based on the strict liability im-
posed by the jurisdictional element. See id. The district court, in agreement with
the prosecution, imposed the lowest sentence within the guideline range and
commented:
You know, I tend to agree with your gut reaction to this. This is an awful
stretch, it seems to me, of the interstate commerce clause. And I don't
think it would hurt anyone to get that clarified .... I think all the parties
21
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developing pornographic shots of young females, the Southland
Pharmacy reported Corp to the local police. 153 However, officials
discovered that only one minor, Sandra Sauntman, was photo-
graphed approximately three to five months before she attained
the majority age of eighteen. 15 4
The court addressed the proper Commerce Clause framework
by providing an overview of the Supreme Court's analysis in Lopez
and Morrison.'55 Next, the court addressed other circuits' decisions,
particularly Robinson, Bausch and Rodia from the First, Eighth and
Third Circuits, respectively. 156 The court rejected the strictjurisdic-
tional approach used in Robinson and Bausch, while agreeing with
Rodia that:
A hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional
element automatically ensures the constitutionality of a
statute ignores the fact that the connection between the
activity regulated and the jurisdictional hook may be so
attenuated as to fail to guarantee that the activity regu-
lated has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 157
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that by applying the jurisdictional
hook approach, the CPRPE Act had an extremely wide sweep.' 58
Furthermore, the court declined to use the Wickard approach by
considering the aggregate effect of the purely intrastate possession
on interstate commerce. 159 By applying the Commerce Clause pre-
agree that the case is outside the heartland of the statute which is in-
tended to punish people who engage in sexual abuse of minors by either
abusing the minors or having pictures of such activity or sexual acts by
minors.
Id.
153. See id. at 326 (stating that Corp made derogatory remarks about photos
when he presented film).
154. For additional information regarding Sauntman's voluntary participa-
tion, see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
155. See Corp, 236 F.3d at 328-31 (describing facts and legal analysis of Com-
merce Clause precedent).
156. For a discussion of the courts' holdings, see supra notes 83 and 117 and
accompanying text.
157. Corp, 236 F.3d at 330-31 (quoting United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465,
472-73 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)(implying that jurisdictional elements are useful only when they can ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that regulated activity affects interstate commerce).
158. See Corp, 236 F.3d at 331 (illustrating point through example of "[a]
painter using a model who was just under eighteen, even if it was his wife, would
fall afoul of the statute if the paints, brushes, or canvas had traveled in interstate
commerce").
159. See id. at 332 (rejecting, although not expressly, approach adopted by
Fifth Circuit in Kallestad).
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cedent and addressing additional relevant questions, the court con-
cluded that Corp's activities were neither substantially related nor
connected to interstate commerce. 16 ° The court surmised that
Corp was not the typical offender feared by Congress that would
become addicted to pornography and perpetuate the industry.' 61
IV. CIRCUIT COURT CRITIQUE
The Circuits developed three completely different interpreta-
tions of Congress' authority to regulate child pornography under
section 2252 (a) (4) (B). First, Bausch and Robinson supported the
strict jurisdictional hook. 162 These courts reasoned that the de-
fendants triggered the Commerce Clause when the items them-
selves or the materials used to produce the items crossed state
borders.
Second, Angle and Kallestad supported the "Wickard market the-
ory."'163 The courts disagreed that a jurisdictional hook alone can
render section 2252 (a) (4) (B) constitutionally valid. 164 In these
cases, the court determined that, regardless of the defendant's mo-
tive, intrastate possession perpetuates the national market of child
pornography. 165 The courts' inquiry focused on the national mar-
160. See id. In determining whether Corp's conduct had an effect on inter-
state commerce, the court posed the following questions:
Was the activity in this case related to explicit and graphic pictures of
children engaged in sexual activity, particularly children about fourteen
years of age or under, for commercial or exploitive purposes? Were there
multiple children so pictured? Were the children otherwise sexually
abused? Was there a record that defendant repeatedly engaged in such
conduct or other sexually abusive conduct with children? Did defendant
move from place to place, or state to state, and repeatedly engage in pro-
duction of such pictures of children?
Id. at 333.
161. See id. The court noted that Corp did not intend to use the photos in a
commercial nature. See id. at 332. Sauntman was neither an "exploited child" nor
a victim and was mere months away from majority. See id.
162. For the facts and courts' analyses in these two cases see supra notes 65-75
and accompanying text.
163. For the facts and courts' analyses in these two cases, see supra notes 121-
51 and accompanying text.
164. See United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 337 (7th Cir. 2000) (doubting
whether jurisdictional hook alone guaranteed that intrastate possession substan-
tially affected interstate commerce); United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229
(5th Cir. 2000) (stating when "relationship between the interstate and local activity
is attenuated, a jurisdictional hook alone cannot justify ... Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.").
165. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 338 (finding that aggregated private use was reason-
ably connected and essential part of larger economic and commercial child por-
nography industry).
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ket, rather than the individual offender's non-commercial private
use. 166
Third, Corp held that the defendant's conduct must be ex-
amined to determine if the individual substantially affected inter-
state commerce. 167  Corp addressed the statutory language,
congressional intent and commerce clause precedent most
accurately. 16
8
A. Strict Jurisdictional Hook
First, the strict jurisdictional hook method is contrary to com-
merce clause precedent because it does not ensure that the activity
at issue substantially affects interstate commerce or is economic in
nature.1 69 The jurisdictional hook is appropriate only when it im-
poses limits on interstate regulations or guarantees that the intra-
state activity will fall within the three permissible Lopez factors. ' 70
As applied in Bausch and Robinson, the jurisdictional hook poses no
limit on interstate regulations. 171 Furthermore, the jurisdictional
element in no way guarantees the intrastate activity is economic in
nature.172 Under this approach, the federal government could reg-
166. See id. (rationalizing that in order to effectively regulate national market
and decrease child abuse, pure intrastate possession must be regulated).
167. See Corp, 236 F.3d at 332 (holding that although child pornography in-
dustry was highly organized and operated on nationwide scale, aggregated effects
on interstate commerce of purely intrastate possession was immaterial).
168. See id. at 327-33 (analyzing statutory language, Lopez and Morrison frame-
work, previous Circuit decisions and facts of this case to reach proper decision).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
that jurisdictional element did not establish substantial connection to interstate
commerce); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995) (il-
lustrating that statutory imposed requirement of jurisdictional nexus to interstate
commerce will not insulate statute from judicial review).
170. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995). "[I]n Lopez
the Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal statutes must have such an
element, or that all statutes with such an element would be constitutional, or that
any statute without such an element is per se unconstitutional." Id.; Andrew St.
Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law,
31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61, 99-100 (1998).
A purely nominal jurisdictional requirement, that some entity or object
involved in the crime be drawn from interstate commerce, does nothing
to prevent the shifting of [federal/state] balance in favor of the federal
government. As has been amply demonstrated, virtually all criminal ac-
tions in the United States involve the use of some object that has passed
through interstate commerce.
St. Laurent, supra at 113.
171. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
almost all film, cameras and diskettes travel through interstate commerce).
172. See id. "[T]he [statute's] jurisdictional element - the requirement that
precursor materials like film or cameras moved in interstate commerce - is only
tenuously related to the ultimate activity regulated: intrastate possession of child por-
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ulate nearly everything. The courts overlook the "case-by-case ba-
sis" requirement that the particular possession of child
pornography affect interstate commerce.17s This approach is also
contrary to the ideals framed in our Constitution regarding
federalism.1 74
B. Wickard Market Theory
Next, the Wickard market theory is also contrary to the purpose
of the CPRPE Act. Under this approach, the extremely broad con-
stitutional sweep of the CPRPE Act poses no limit to Congress' reg-
ulations. The courts framed the judicial review as whether
Congress could have rationally believed that intrastate possession of
child pornography substantially affected interstate commerce, and
if so, that the regulatory means were reasonably adapted to a per-
missible end. 175 There is no question that intrastate possession can
affect interstate commerce. 76 The fault, however, is that the courts
applied a blanket "Wickard market theory" to determine that all in-
nography." Id. (emphasis added); see also Corp, 236 F.3d at 331 (indicating that
despite foreign camera used to photograph minor, non-economic, private use of
photos contributes in no way to interstate commerce).
173. Compare United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998) (af-
firming defendant's conviction based on fact that camera traveled through inter-
state commerce, even though defendant's photographs of minors were not
intended to be placed in commerce and never traveled in interstate commerce),
with Corp, 236 F.3d at 332-33 (reversing defendant's conviction by not applying
jurisdictional hook and determining that, on facts of case, defendant's activity was
not substantially connected or related to interstate commerce).
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Id.; see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 644-45 (2000) (stating that federalism "is the instrument by which asser-
tions of national power are to be limited in favor of preserving a supposedly dis-
cernible, proper sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as
the individual States see fit").
175. See United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 338 (holding that punishing
intrastate possession (regulatory means) rationally connected to prohibiting inter-
state commerce of child pornography (asserted ends)).
176. See Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 474-80 (providing detailed review of legislative
findings and evaluating individual's role in national market under Wickard).
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trastate possession effects the national market. 177 Corp proves that
this assertion is simply not true.'17
The Third Circuit, in Rodia, admitted that courts have abused
the Wickard principle by applying it to economically distinct cases
and non-economic cases. 179 The statute is overinclusive under this
application and is essentially analogous to strict liability.'8
C. Sixth Circuit Corp Analysis
The Sixth Circuit, in Corp, reached the correct decision by eval-
uating the defendant's behavior and personal impact on the na-
tional child pornography market in light of the Lopez factors
framework. This approach applies the same judicial review requir-
ing a rational connection between the interstate activity and inter-
state affect, however does not apply the strict Wickard market
theory.181 Instead, this approach properly focuses on the defen-
dant's conduct on a "case-by-case basis."182 Thus, this analysis en-
sures that the intrastate possession of child pornography has in fact
substantially affected interstate commerce. 18 3 When comparing the
facts of the cases reviewed in this Comment, this judicial review
177. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.
[T] he Court warned that the scope of the interstate commerce power
"must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is na-
tional and what is local and create a completely centralized government."
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
178. See Corp, 236 F.3d at 332 (finding defendant's purely private use of pho-
tograph of minor was not a commercial activity and did not substantially affect
interstate commerce).
179. See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 476-77 (stating courts glossed over fact that Wickard
applies to only economic activities and that courts have stretched true intrastate
and interstate connection).
180. See id. at 479. The court acknowledged this approach supported the
broad proposition that Congress could regulate any intrastate activity when a large
national market existed for it. See id. The court justified their rationale by present-
ing two factors that limited the holding. See id. First, this regulation does not
constitute a "sharp break" in federal legislation because federal statutes have ad-
dressed child pornography for over twenty years. See id. Second, Congress added
§ 2252(a) (4) (B) to close the loophole in the legislation and improve its overall
effectiveness. See id.
181. See Corp, 236 F.3d at 330-31 (citing cases that support argument that pres-
ence of jurisdictional hook alone, does not automatically deem activity had sub-
stantial affect on interstate commerce or activity was commercial in nature).
182. See id. at 332 (stating that government failed to meet burden that Corp's
activity substantially affected interstate commerce).
183. See id. (rejecting application of aggregate effect on interstate commerce
and notion that child pornography addiction causes all possessors to seek more
perverse materials).
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clearly does not impose a high burden of proof, merely one that is
fair and just.
After all, the purpose of the statute is to eradicate the child
pornography industry by punishing actual child pornography ad-
dicts and individuals that perpetuate the industry. 84 This ap-
proach also guarantees the defendant's conduct falls within the
permissible Lopez factors, specifically, a commercial and economic
activity. 185 The child exploiter/abuser or the child pornographer
that shares or trades material will be punished. Various other laws
are available to punish defendants that fall outside the scope of sec-
tion 2252(a) (4) (B). 18 6
V. CONCLUSION
Child pornography is a multi-million dollar nationwide indus-
try that can destroy children and families. 187 Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 2252, specifically, section 2252(a) (4) (B), to eradicate this
industry and punish individuals that perpetuate the industry. Con-
gress' ability to regulate intrastate possession of child pornography
is confined to its enumerated powers in the Constitution.18 8 When
the courts properly enforce section 2252 (a) (4) (B), the CPRPE Act
is a legitimate exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
The circuit courts, applying the Lopez and Morrison framework,
have reached different rationale in upholding Congress' power to
regulate purely intrastate possession of child pornography. 89 First,
the First and Eighth Circuits applied the strict jurisdictional ele-
ment to ensure that each defendant's actions directly affected inter-
state commerce. 190 Second, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits applied
184. See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 474-77 (providing legislative history that led to
promulgation).
185. For a listing of the Lopez factors, see supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
186. For examples of laws that punish individuals involved in child pornogra-
phy, see supra note 12.
187. See Doyle, supra note 2, at 125. Children tend to be coerced into the
production of pornography with gifts, affection, kindness and attention. See id.
Victims usually have been carefully seduced and often do not realize they are vic-
tims, thereby these individuals repeatedly and voluntarily return to the offender
until it is too late. See id.
188. For an enumeration of Congress' authority to regulate interstate com-
merce, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of the different courts' holdings regarding Congress'
authority to regulate child pornography under the CPRPE Act, see supra notes 58-
101 and accompanying text.
190. For an analysis of a strict jurisdictional hook application, see supra notes
169-74 and accompanying text.
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the Wickard market theory rationalizing that the only way to eradi-
cate the national market was to eliminate the aggregated affect of
individual's supply and demand. 91 The Sixth Circuit correctly re-
fused to extend the rationales that the jurisdictional element was
alone sufficient and intrastate possession, regardless of commercial
or non-commercial nature, posed an aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.
192
The Sixth Circuit in Corp properly framed the issue as whether
Congress had a rational basis for believing that the intrastate posses-
sion of child pornography had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Furthermore, the court noted that the jurisdictional el-
ement required, on a case-by-case basis, that the particular activity
at issue had a substantial impact on commerce. 93 This judicial re-
view limits the potentially broad sweep of the statute, upholds the
values of the Constitution and nonetheless provides Congress with
an effective weapon to combat the evil that is child pornography.
Dean C. Seman
191. For a Wickard Market Theory application analysis, see supra notes 175-80
and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's proper analysis application, see
supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
193. For an account of the type of questions that need to be analyzed to deter-
mine if a particular activity had a substantial impact on commerce, see supra note
160.
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